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Book Reviews 
THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION. By Joseph Gold-
stein.t Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xx, 201. 
Cloth, $22.95. 
Thomas E. Baker 2 
Professor Goldstein is to be congratulated for publishing a 
book for a primary audience numbering only nine (his "nonet") 
with a wider secondary readership. As a member of his secondary 
readership, I found his basic premise appealing and his critique per-
suasive. Regrettably, his proposed reforms are neither. I am there-
fore doubtful that his book will influence his primary audience, at 
least not as much as he hopes or as much as I wish it would. 
The author derives his basic premise from Chief Justice Mar-
shall's admonition in McCulloch : "[W]e must never forget, that it 
is a constitution we are expounding."3 In performing this "ex-
pounding" function, Professor Goldstein insists that Supreme 
Court "communications [Supreme Court opinions] on behalf of and 
to We the People who 'decided' to establish the Constitution must 
be something that We can understand if We are to remain sover-
eign, if Our consent to the government is to be sustained." (au-
thor's emphasis and capitalization). The "thesis of this book," in 
the words of the author, "is that the justices, as members of a col-
lective body, have an obligation to maintain the Constitution, in 
opinions of the Court and also in concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, as something intelligible-something that We the People of 
the United States can understand." Functionally, this intelligibility 
is essential to allow "Us, the governed and the governors, a basis for 
discovering 'faults' in the Constitution and for deliberating and de-
ciding whether to speak out and to seek the correction of its 'errors' 
in controversy before the Court or by amendment." The author 
I. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Alvin R. Allison Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. 
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in the 
original). 
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likens the High Court's proper role to the Committees of Detail and 
Style at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. 
Who could argue with Professor Goldstein's premise? Who 
could disagree with his prototypical examples: holding up Chief 
Justice Marshall's McCulloch4 as the successfully intelligible opin-
ion and the various opinions in Webster s as the failures? My only 
concern is that the author's premise might be misunderstood by 
some to claim an exaggerated role for judicial review, going beyond 
those two duly-constituted Committees. It seems clear to me that 
he is not advocating that the Supreme Court perform as a Council 
of Revision for the Constitution, a role the Philadelphia Convention 
wisely rejected.6 Properly understood, the obligation of intelligibil-
ity is an essential limitation on the power of the Court. It can act 
legitimately only within "the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment."7 The power of the sword and the purse were denied the 
federal judiciary so that it could demonstrate judgment; Supreme 
Court decisions should be well-grounded and not merely acts of 
will. s Opinions that are intelligible help us to discern the difference. 
The real strength of this book is Professor Goldstein's critique 
of four different lines of Supreme Court decisions. His four "opin-
ion studies," presented in as many chapters, are meant "to provide 
a basis for assessing the adequacy of judicial opinions as communi-
cations about the Constitution." The author is not concerned with 
the result reached on the merits. Instead, his focus is the coherency 
of the Justices' written workproduct. 
Discussing Usery 9 and Garcia, 10 the author complains that the 
opinion writing in this line of federalism decisions is characterized 
by obfuscation and disingenuousness. Analyzing Cooper v. Aaron 11 
and its aftermath, he concludes that the unanimous opinion for the 
4. Id. It is somewhat ironic that in his own time Chief Justice Marshall felt compelled 
to explain and defend this exemplar opinion with a letter to the editor signed "A Friend to 
the Union." Gerald Gunther, John Marshall, ''A Friend of the Constitution": In Defense and 
Elaboration of McCulloch v. Maryland, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 449 (1969). 
5. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
6. There is a profound difference between "expounding" and "expanding" on the Con-
stitution. Professor Goldstein thought enough of the difference to insist that the New York 
Times publish a correction in an op-ed essay he wrote to support the confirmation of Judge 
Bork. Joseph Goldstein, That Was the Real Bark Who Testified, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, 
at 23, col. 2, as corrected Oct. 3, 1987. 
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See generally Lino A. 
Graglia, "Constitutional Theory": The Attempted Justification for the Supreme Court's Liberal 
Political Program, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 789 (1987). 
8. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464, 472 
(Mentor, 1961). 
9. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
10. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
ll. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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Court was written with a purposeful and misleading ambiguity re-
garding the difference between desegregation and integration. Com-
paring Brown 112 and Brown //,13 he chides the Justices for their 
equivocation between the first holding that racially segregated pub-
lic schools violated the Constitution and the second holding that the 
equitable remedy was to be implemented "with all deliberate 
speed." Finally, he argues that the oral summary Justice Powell 
read from the bench, announcing the Bakke 14 decision, was much 
more accessible and comprehensible than the various, lengthy pub-
lished opinions. 
These four chapters are thoughtful and thorough accounts. 
Professor Goldstein carefully examines the opinions themselves--
majority, concurring and dissenting-along with much of the previ-
ously published scholarship about these decisions. The reader is 
made to feel as if she is a student in the seminar the author has 
taught at the Yale University Law School for the last decade. It is 
as if Professor Goldstein has turned over to us his lecture notes. 
And we should be grateful. 
It seems to me that Professor Goldstein should have chosen the 
better part of intellectual valor, and should have ended his book 
about twenty-five pages sooner. He could have chosen to conclude 
with his exhortation that "the justices consider fashioning for them-
selves canons of comprehensibility to guide their opinion-writing" 
and "provide themselves with an occasion to review ... what they 
have written." Then this book review would have ended here, 
probably with the typical reviewer's cheap shot, wide of the mark to 
mix metaphors, to say that the author was long on criticism and 
short on constructive suggestions. Whether out of hubris or na-
ivete, Professor Goldstein chose to go on to "proffer, for purposes of 
illustration, some canons of comprehensibility and a process for 
making them operative." I found this last chapter at best unhelpful 
and at worst unrealistic. It detracts from the rest of the book. 
My reader can decide just how helpful are the author's "five 
overlapping and intertwined canons of comprehensibility": 
1. Use simple and precise language "level to the under-
standing of all." 
2. Write with candor and clarity. 
12. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
13. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
14. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The regular 
publication that most resembles Justice Powell's bench summary is Preview of United States 
Supreme Coun Cases, published by the American Bar Association with the cooperation of the 
Association of American Law Schools and the American Newspaper Association Founda-
tion. The author of this review serves as a Contributing Editor to Preview. 
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3. Acknowledge and explain deliberate ambiguity. 
4. Be accurate and scrupulously fair in making attribu-
tions to another opinion in the case. 
5. Incorporate in the text, rather than relegate to foot-
notes, material that is directly related to the reasons 
for the decision or to the meaning or breadth of the 
holding.ls 
I will briefly make the case for a "reality check." 
It seems to me that the real problem with Supreme Court opin-
ions is shared by this book. It is a problem of audience and empha-
sis. A Supreme Court opinion is written for multiple audiences.l6 
The Justices, not infrequently, seek to communicate, to persuade 
and to guide the coordinate political branches at the national level 
and policymakers at the state level. On occasion, the Court speaks 
to scholars, historians and interested others.11 There are three pri-
mary audiences, however, for every Supreme Court opinion: the 
citizenry, the parties before the Court and the Justices themselves. 
The thesis of this book is that the citizenry audience-We the 
People-is ill-served by most of the opinion writing of the contem-
porary Justices. Professor Goldstein's premise is that the Supreme 
Court has a constitutional responsibility to perform the role Ralph 
Lerner once described as the "republican schoolmaster."Is The 
contemporary Court most certainly confronts the citizenry on the 
important issues of the day. There is a "proper connection between 
judicial power and public opinion."I9 One essential role for the 
High Court is to engage in "high political education,"2o always to 
be distinguished from the logical fallacy argumentum ad populum 
at the opposite extreme. While I agree that it can and should per-
form better in this role, I must defend the Court. The other two 
primary audiences ought to take precedence.21 
15. This canon seems to be more particular and less significant than the others and it is 
at least footnoteworthy to observe that it is found in a book which features both footnotes and 
endnotes. 
16. See Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1357 (1988). 
17. What role scholars should play-writing for their audiences of justices, each other 
and others-is a complex and difficult question. See Conference on Constitutional Law: Con-
stitutional Theory and the Practice of Judging, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 291 (1992); The Idea of the 
Constitution, 37 J. Legal Educ. 153 (1987). See also Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-
Revisited, 48 Va. L. Rev. 279 (1962). 
18. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S. Ct. Rev. 
127. See also Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. 
Rev. I (1979). 
19. Lerner, 1967 S. Ct. Rev. at 129 (cited in note 18). 
20. ld. 
21. See generally Joseph M. Hassett, Should Supreme Court Justices Deliberate More 
Before They Begin to Write, 63 Judicature 414 (1980); Robert A. Letlar, Honest Judicial 
Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 721 (1979); Robert A. Letlar, Quality in Judicial Opinions, 3 
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Consider the audience of the litigants. The raison d'etre for the 
written appellate opinion is to decide the "case or controversy" 
before the Court and to communicate the result and reasoning to 
the party litigants and their advocates. The power of judicial review 
itself springs from this essential judicial duty to interpret and to 
decide.22 Evaluated from this perspective, the Justices' opinions are 
effective communications. Read the briefs in some cases before the 
Court. Then read the different opinions from the Court. They are 
written in the same language of the law and the same dialect of a 
court constitutionel. The Justices themselves have little patience 
with an advocate who narrowly focuses on the facts and issues of a 
particular case and ignores their larger import.23 We should expect 
the same wide-angled decisionmaking from the Justices. Indeed, 
the present Court seems inclined to decide cases on the broadest 
basis.24 The audience of litigants and advocates arguably is well-
served by contemporary opinion writing. 
Consider the audience of the Justices. The implicit but telling 
criticism in this book is the somewhat paradoxical complaint that 
the Justices are writing too much for themselves and then are not 
taking their writings seriously. My somewhat inadequate response 
is that this problem is inherent in the common law methodology. 
The technique of stare decisis is in the control of the individual Jus-
tices who constitute the Court that is called on to decide the partic-
ular case. The deciding Court identifies the past precedents that 
apply and goes on to follow them or distinguish them, as it deems 
appropriate. Unlike the deference afforded an earlier Congress 
when the issue is one of statutory interpretation, what the earlier set 
of Justices intended in their previously published opinions does not 
control. The deciding Court's understanding of those earlier deci-
sions, the principle the deciding Justices discern in past volumes of 
United States Reports, is all that matters.2s This is how Constitu-
tional Law, to be distinguished from the Constitution, is written 
Pace L. Rev. 579 (1983); Joseph W. Little, The Workload of the United States Supreme Court: 
Ruling the Pen with the Tongue, 6 J. Legal Prof. 51 (1981); Robert A. Prentice, Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 85 (1983); Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal 
Method, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 248 (1981); Irving Younger, On Judicial Opinions Considered as 
One of the Fine Arts: The Coen Lecture, 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341 (1980); James Boyd White, 
Judging the Judges: Three Opinions, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 697 (1990). 
22. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177-78. 
23. See Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman and Stephen M. Shapiro, Supreme Court 
Practice§ 14.1 at 577-80 (BNA, 6th ed. 1986). But see Lyle Denniston, The Judicial Politics 
of Abortion, Am. Lawyer, June 1992 at 95; Abortion and the Law: A Day in Court After Years 
of Skirmishing; Excerpts From Supreme Court Arguments on Pennsylvania Abortion Law, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1992, at Bto, col. I. 
24. See R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 n.3 (1992). 
25. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Lagic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Thinking 7-
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and revised. It is understandable, at least, and arguably appropri-
ate, therefore, that the Justices writing opinions should be preoccu-
pied with the audience of future Justices deciding future cases. 
While I agree with Professor Goldstein's criticism that the Justices 
may be slighting the audience of the general citizenry, I submit this 
is a matter of degree or emphasis and, furthermore, there is a good 
reason for it.26 
Professor Goldstein suggests that the Justices enforce the ca-
nons of comprehensibility with a "final-phase conference", a confi-
dential meeting with only the Justices present, patterned after the 
traditional conference, presently held after oral argument, at which 
the Justices discuss the merits of the cases, take tentative votes, and 
assign opinion writing: 
The conference would provide members of the court with a fo-
cused opportunity to review together one another's work. It 
would be an occasion for meeting their institutional responsibil-
ity to ensure that the totality of opinions is comprehensible 
before the Court goes public. 
Not! 
The greatest opinions of Benjamin Cardozo, one of our greatest 
appellate judges, would not fare well under the canons.27 Justice 
Holmes's dissent in Lochner,2s the "greatest judicial opinion of the 
last hundred years," would fail Professor Goldstein's final examina-
tion.29 If such judicial giants would not earn an Honors grade, 
what grade can our incumbent Justices expect and what can we ex-
pect from them? I do not wish to join the debate over the strengths 
and weaknesses of the current Justices.3o I would suggest that some 
of them are not constitutionally able to write succinct and clear 
18 (C. Boardman Co., 1989); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1-8 (U. of 
Chi. Press, 1949). 
26. Whether the Justices are sufficiently respectful of precedent is a more difficult ques-
tion and beyond the pale of a book review. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 
2791, 2808-16 (1992); Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991). See generally 
David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 63 (W.W. Norton 
Co., 3d ed. 1993) (number of overrulings of Supreme Court precedents since 1953 exceeds 
total for all the years prior). 
27. Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 33-57 (U. of Chi. Press, 1990). 
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
29. It is not logically organized, does not join issue sharply with the majority, is 
not scrupulous in its treatment of the majority opinion or of precedent, is not thor-
oughly researched, does not exploit the factual record, and is highly unfair to poor 
old Herbert Spencer .... 
Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 285 (Harv. U. Press, 
1988) (footnote omitted). 
30. Compare, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrity, 77 A.B.A. J. 74 (Oct. 1991) with 
Paul R. Baier, Charges of Mediocrity Unfounded, 78 A.B.A. J. 59 (Feb. 1992). 
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opinions.JI Others, who might be able, likely are not motivated to 
do so.32 And still others likely could not care less.33 Gathered to-
gether at a California-style editing session, I do not understand how 
the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts. I cannot imagine 
that the Justices would be willing even to try it. Earth to Yale: it 
ain't gonna' happen. 
This leads me finally to consider what the Justices might do 
differently or better in an effort to respond to the criticisms Profes-
sor Goldstein levels at their opinions. I think that the worst logisti-
cal problem that needs to be solved is the so-called "June Crunch." 
When the Supreme Court holds about 40 percent of its nine-month 
caseload, including many of its most controversial and controverted 
cases, until the last month of the Term, as it did this past June, this 
phenomenon results in "an avalanche of hastily completed and 
poorly crafted decisions."34 A recent issue of Judicature, the official 
publication of the American Judicature Society, contained an edito-
rial which concluded, "The end-of-term deluge of Supreme Court 
decisions makes it difficult for the press to report, and the public to 
understand, the work of the Court."Js The editorial suggested some 
examples of ways the Court might adjust its intramural procedures 
to avoid the June crunch: adopting an eight month deadline for all 
opinions; adjusting the tenure of law clerks; announcing some deci-
sions during the summer recess; and even reconsidering the practice 
of being in recess during the summer months.36 
31. With all due respect for a jurist who has made important contributions to Constitu-
tional Law, have you ever heard Justice White deliver a speech? See generally John M. Rog-
ers, "/ Vote This Way Because I'm Wrong':· The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 
Ky. L. J. 439 (1990-91). 
32. "Acknowledging his frustration in a humorous vein, Justice Scalia periodically asks 
his own clerks: 'What's a smart guy like me doing in a place like this?'" Paul M. Barrett, 
The Loner: Despite Expectations, Scalia Fails to Unify Conservatives on Court, Wall St. J., 
Apr. 28, 1992, at AI, A6. When he does write an opinion reminiscent of The Federalist 
Papers, Justice Scalia's colleagues do not seem impressed, or at least are not persuaded. See 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting "solo voce"). 
33. In an interview about how the Court operates, Justice Rehnquist was quoted to say: 
I used to think, you know, if there were an expression in a footnote in an opinion 
that I disagreed with, that we're going to be stuck with that footnote for years. 
Well, it turns out that any time five people decide that we're not stuck with the 
footnote, we're not stuck with the footnote! And things have a way of evolving on 
much more of a common-sense reaction to things than a strictly doctrinal approach, 
where A follows from B from C. 
John A. Jenkins, The Partisan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 28. See also 
Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. at 261 I. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 469 
U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
34. Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk; In Surprise. High Court Appears Less Solid, 
N.Y. Times, May 31, 1992, at 18, col. I. 
35. Editorial, Promoting Public Understanding of the Supreme Court, 76 Judicature 4 
(June-July 1992). 
36. Id. 
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I would hope that veteran Court-watchers will focus on this 
problem and propose creative solutions. Critiques like Professor 
Goldstein's will help to draw attention to the problems with the 
June opinions. The Justices seem to have solved past problems with 
screening cases, as evidenced by the notable fall-off in the number of 
cases granted review in the last few Terms.37 We can hope that 
Professor Goldstein's audience nonet next will address the problems 
caused by the June Crunch: 
There are ways for the Court to maintain a current docket 
without the cost associated with the end-of-term onslaught of 
opinions. If, and as, the Court fashions an alternative, it will 
again demonstrate leadership in accommodating the demands of 
the judicial process to the public's interest in keeping abreast of 
the work of its govemment.3s 
This kind of leadership would result in real progress towards the 
goal of making the Constitution intelligible to We the People.39 
LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
PRACfiCE. Edited by Gregory Leyh.t Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press. 1992. Pp. xix, 325. $45.00. 
Paul Campos 2 
I 
Seven hundred years ago, amid the orange groves of Catalonia, 
there lived a man named Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia. He was a 
Spanish Jew whose only passion was the study of God's words, and 
on a languid Mediterranean afternoon his sleep was troubled by a 
voice in a dream: 
The words of the Holy One, blessed be He, are not like our 
words. Men speak and write with whatever signs chance might 
37. Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk; Mystery for Court: Case of the Dwindling 
Docket, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1990, at 10, col. 4; Tony Mauro, Light Schedule Leads to Tight 
Deadlines, Legal Times, Feb. 17, 1992, at 8. See generally Samuel Estreicher and John Sex-
ton, Redefining the Supreme Court's Role (Yale U. Press, 1986); Thomas E. Baker, Siskel and 
Ebert At The Supreme Court, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1472 (1989) (book review). 
38. Editorial, 76 Judicature at 42 (cited in note 35). Not everyone is sanguine. See 
Tony Mauro, Relieving the Pain of the "June Crunch", Legal Times, July 20, 1992, at 12 
(concluding "nothing can be done"). . 
39. See also Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 164-65 (Apr. 2, 1990) (dis-
cussing the importance of effective judicial communications with the press and public). 
1. Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
